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SI: Platforms and Cultural Productions
Introduction
In an article entitled “The Changing Sites of Sound,” Paul du 
Gay and Keith Negus detail “the shift in power relations” 
taking place within the recorded music industry. According 
to du Gay and Negus (1994), “profound transformations in 
the distribution system” are introducing tensions between 
record labels and “those whose expertise is based upon 
knowledge of (music) consumption” (p. 396).
If it wasn’t for the fact that this article appeared over 
25 years ago, the reader could be forgiven for assuming that 
the authors were commenting on contemporary music 
streaming platforms. However, the “sites of sound” du Gay 
and Negus are referring to are not platforms like Spotify, 
but rather music retailers like HMV. As they explain, a sys-
tem historically characterized by “forward integration”—
whereby record labels exerted control over the retailers by 
controlling the product—was by the early 1990s experienc-
ing a degree of “backward integration,” as retailers began 
to exert greater influence over “the way in which music is 
presented and sold” (du Gay and Negus, p. 409, emphasis 
in original).
Today, online platforms—rather than offline retailers—
appear to be exerting control over content suppliers. While 
record labels worry about Spotify rather than HMV, book 
publishers worry about Amazon rather than Barnes & Noble. 
The content platforms that are the focus of this Special Issue 
can be understood as mediators that “transform, translate, 
distort, and modify the meaning or the elements they are sup-
posed to carry” (Latour, 2005, p. 39). One of the ways plat-
forms “transform, translate, distort, and modify” is through 
their role in organizing and programming the content they 
carry. While platforms like Facebook, YouTube, or Spotify 
do not produce—or own—most of the content they circulate, 
they curate content, and in doing so they “transform” this 
content. In turn, platforms inaugurate relations of depen-
dency among creators and the industries they draw upon.
Recent academic work has recognized the critical shaping 
influence platforms have over the industries they enter, and 
the commodities they exchange (Langley & Leyshon, 2017; 
Srnicek, 2017). In relation to the cultural industries, the con-
cept of “platformization” is defined by Nieborg and Poell 
(2018) as “the penetration of economic, governmental and 
infrastructural extensions of digital platforms into the web 
and app ecosystems . . .” (p. 2). This is a process that is seen 
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to fundamentally affect—even compromise—cultural pro-
ducers and the content they create.
But where does the “power” of platformization reside? A 
seemingly obvious response would be that power is in the 
platforms themselves. To come to this conclusion, however, 
would be to ignore the political economy of platforms and 
their embeddedness in a complex array of markets (Eriksson 
et al., 2019). As is widely recognized, platforms are “match-
makers” (Evans & Schmalensee, 2016) which interface 
between different markets or “sides,” thus constituting multi-
sided markets (Nieborg & Poell, 2018, p. 4277). Facebook, 
for example, does not only match advertisers with users, it 
also connects “companies, institutions, and content develop-
ers, each of which operate in different regions and have dif-
ferent histories, incentives, and business models” (Nieborg 
& Poell, 2018, p. 4282).
To succeed, platforms must address the “chicken and-egg 
problem”: because the sides are linked, platforms must 
get all sides on board (Rochet & Tirole, 2003, p. 990). These 
various markets encompass conflicting interests and power 
differentials (Rieder & Sire, 2014). Thus, while platforms are 
certainly not neutral distributors, they are also not inherently 
“powerful.” Power is instead an always unstable and shifting 
outcome of the ongoing attempt to coordinate between these 
markets.
To examine this shifting locus of power, this article 
focuses on Spotify. The leading audio streaming platform in 
the world, Spotify operates by bringing together various 
markets, agents, and interests. Music is marketed to listeners 
who are, in turn, marketed to advertisers. At the same time, 
Spotify must attract investment within the finance market. 
Spotify’s survival is dependent on its ability to successfully 
stitch together the various markets it operates within (see 
Vonderau, 2019).
Through a close reading of press, trade publications, and 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings, 
Spotify’s struggle to “get all sides on board” will be illumi-
nated by shining a spotlight on playlists. Playlists are the 
central means through which music is organized and pre-
sented on Spotify. Curated by either a person or an algorithm 
(see Bonini & Gandini, 2019), a playlist consists of a collec-
tion of songs organized around a common genre, theme, 
mood, or activity. Research has shown that Spotify has since 
around 2013 transformed itself from a distributor of music 
into a producer of a “branded musical experience” (Morris & 
Powers, 2015) through playlist curation (Eriksson et al., 
2019). Scholars have discussed the topic of playlists in rela-
tion to the appropriation of fan “labor” (Drew, 2005), plat-
form brand differentiation (Morris & Powers, 2015), user 
practices (Hagen, 2015), the digital music commodity 
(Morris, 2015), gatekeeping (Bonini & Gandini, 2019), and 
as “container technologies” (Eriksson, 2020). However, a 
key element has yet to be examined: what playlists can reveal 
about broader structural dynamics within the platform econ-
omy. The objective of this article is thus to examine the 
shifting locus of platform power through a case study of 
Spotify’s curation of playlists.
As a sociotechnical feature common to many platforms, 
playlists reveal the politics of “selection” (van Dijck et al., 
2018)—a key mechanism through which platforms such as 
Spotify attempt to create platform dependence. This is intro-
ducing tensions that recall the battle between labels and 
retailers in the 1990s. In the first special collection of Social 
Media+Society on the platformization of cultural production, 
Bonini and Gandini (2019) looked at the “algo-torial power” 
of platforms, highlighting the “specific intermingling of 
human and algorithmic processes” as new agents of music 
gatekeeping. In this contribution, I argue that playlists are 
not only shaped by a blend of editorial and algorithmic logic, 
but by pressures and tensions between the various markets 
that any one platform brings together. Playlists, I will argue, 
provide a lens through which to view the sometimes con-
flicted, sometimes complementary, interplay between these 
multiple markets.
In what follows, three of the most important markets that 
Spotify coordinates will be examined: the music market; the 
advertising market; and the finance market. While important 
work has examined how playlist curation works on stream-
ing platforms (Bonini & Gandini, 2019), this article will 
examine who playlists work for.
The Music Market
After many years of steep decline, the recording industry is 
finally on the rebound. Music streaming has grown to 
become largest revenue source for the global recording 
industry and Spotify has been hailed as the savior (Farrell & 
Steele, 2018). The company represents a full 27% of global 
recorded music revenues. Even at the peak of the iTunes 
Music Store, Apple’s contribution to the recording industry 
did not exceed 10% of total revenues (Mulligan, 2018b). 
Thus, it is clear that Spotify is assuming an increasingly cen-
tral role in the market for recorded music.
It is therefore not surprising that Spotify has become the 
focus of promotional efforts across the recording industry. 
Much of this focus is on playlists. Playlists have been called 
“the new radio” for the influence they have on breaking new 
songs and artists (Shah, 2018). However, not all playlists are 
created equally: influence varies widely and is largely depen-
dent on who owns the playlist.
Upon logging in to Spotify, one immediately encounters a 
wide selection of playlists. Spotify listeners have created 
over three billion of their own playlists on Spotify. These 
user-generated playlists account for approximately 36% of 
Spotify’s monthly content hours (United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 2018, p. 108). Alongside playl-
ists created by Spotify listeners, are playlists created by 
record labels. The three major record companies each have 
their own playlist brands through which to promote their ros-
ter: Sony has “Filtr,” Warner has “Topsify,” and Universal 
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has “Digster.” Hundreds of playlists available on Spotify 
belong to one of these three brands. The top playlist curated 
by a major label is the Filtr playlist “80s Smash Hits” which 
has over 2 million followers.
However, while these major label playlists have become 
essential tools to promote and distribute music by artists 
signed to these labels, the true hit-makers are the playlists 
owned and curated by Spotify itself. Spotify has created thou-
sands of its own playlists.1 The top Spotify-curated playlist—
the algorithmically generated “Today’s Top Hits”—counts 
over 22 million followers.2 The 35 most followed playlists on 
Spotify (as of January 2019) were all Spotify-curated playl-
ists; as are 99 of the top 100 playlists. According to a study 
conducted for the European Commission,
Spotify’s curated lists have over three quarters of the followers 
of the top 1,000 playlists; Spotify’s algorithmic lists have 
another 9.3 percent. The lists operated by the major record 
labels, Filtr, Digster, and Topsify, have 3.1, 2.7, and 0.9 percent 
of the top 1000’s cumulative followers. The remaining list 
owners have negligible shares. (Aguiar & Waldfogel, 2018, p. 8)
It is thus clear, as Aguiar and Waldfogel (2018) conclude, 
that “Spotify dominates playlists at Spotify” (p. 6).
Spotify claims that the growing centrality of its own 
playlists is a natural outgrowth of its data-driven, listener-
centered model. Critics, however, see it otherwise. While 
record labels in the 1990s complained about HMV using 
sales data to take control of “their product” through pricing 
and display strategies (du Gay and Negus, 1994), online 
platforms like Spotify marshal their wealth of listener data 
to create an entirely new product; by unbundling albums and 
reassembling them into playlists. Critics have interpreted 
Spotify’s playlist push as a “grab for power and control in 
music” (Pelly, 2017). Indeed, Spotify founder and CEO 
Daniel Ek boasted to investors that the growing consump-
tion of Spotify playlists is “a massive transformation” that 
“puts Spotify in control of the demand curve” (Spotify 
Investors, 2019).
In recent years, Spotify has been actively demoting third-
party playlists in favor of their own Spotify-curated playlists 
(Packer, 2016). For example, a search on Spotify’s mobile 
app for the Dutch drum and bass trio “Noisia” returns the 
group’s profile, immediately followed by a Spotify-curated 
playlist of Noisia’s releases (“This is Noisia”), Noisia Radio, 
and several other Spotify-curated playlists featuring Noisia. 
Albums released by the group finally appear only after 
scrolling through a list of Noisia’s most popular tracks, a list 
of artists with similar names, and podcasts. Finally, a list of 
third-party playlists appears; including one curated by the 
group—“This is: Noisia”—which still has more followers 
but is rapidly losing ground to the more recently created and 
prominently placed Spotify-curated playlist.
It is perhaps unsurprising that Spotify promotes its own play-
lists, and that in turn, Spotify-curated playlists exert the greatest 
reach and influence on the platform. The result, however, is that 
to build and sustain a career in the music industry, musicians 
and record labels have become increasingly dependent on land-
ing on Spotify-curated playlists (Iqbal, 2019). Research has 
confirmed the crucial importance of Spotify-curated playlists on 
artists’ careers (Aguiar & Waldfogel, 2018). The European 
Commission study determined that a track placement on 
Spotify’s “Today’s Top Hits” playlist resulted in up to 
US$163,000 in additional revenue. Other popular Spotify-
curated playlists resulted in an even higher payout: “Viva 
Latino!” was found to generate between US$303,047 and 
US$424,265 in added revenue per track (Aguiar & Waldfogel, 
2018). What is more, location is everything: the track must be 
positioned near the top of the playlist in order for there to be the 
greatest impact (Aguiar & Waldfogel, 2018, p. 19).
By leveraging knowledge about the consumption of music 
to control music curation on its platform, Spotify is institut-
ing a degree of “backward integration” in the market for 
music.3 Music artists and record labels are growing increas-
ingly dependent on plum playlist positions—playlists con-
trolled by Spotify. For platforms such as Spotify or YouTube 
who do not own the rights to their own content, playlists are 
a key mechanism through which to exert what we can call 
“curatorial power”: the capacity to advance one’s interests, 
and affect the interests of others, through the organizing and 
programming of content.
However, rumblings of discontent are emerging as record 
labels become increasingly dependent on Spotify playlists. 
Most frustrating for labels is the opacity around the entire 
process of getting playlisted. Spotify instructs artists and 
labels that their tracks first need to perform well on smaller 
playlists before they are considered for Spotify-curated play-
lists. However, while a song’s playlist placement is deter-
mined in part by engagement, impressions, listening duration, 
and skip rates (Bonini & Gandini, 2019), there is no way for 
an artist or their label to know precisely why a particular 
track was placed, or replaced, on a playlist. As Nick 
Holmsten—Spotify’s Global Head of Music admitted: “The 
number one question we get from labels, artists and their 
teams is: who do I speak to (in order) to get on Rap Caviar, 
Hot Country, Viva Latino, Ultimate Indie or other Spotify 
playlists?” (“Spotify Launches New Playlist Consideration 
Feature for Artists, Labels,” 2018). The opacity and formal-
ity of the process makes some industry veterans nostalgic for 
an era when music promotion relied on personal relation-
ships with contacts at radio stations or record stores. As one 
anonymous industry source told me in an interview:
A lot of the older generation are complaining that there’s no 
personal relationship with the editors . . . it’s like back in the day 
I knew every radio DJ and if I wanted to promote a record I 
would just give it to him, play it for him, or invite him out for 
dinner. And now I send it over to the Spotify editors and I get an 
automatic reply email saying “I don’t reply to emails.” (Personal 
communication, 8 November 2018)
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According to a report published by Deutsche Bank, the three 
major labels are also unhappy with the share of major label 
content that Spotify is including in its curated playlists 
(Sandoval, 2018). “Algotorial playlists on Spotify have a 
lower share of major label content,” the report stated. 
Independent research confirms this general picture: a ran-
dom selection of 500 Spotify-curated playlists reveals a 
major label share of just above 50% of all tracks (Prey et al., 
2020).4 Regardless of whether one compares this to the major 
labels’ traditional dominance of radio (Thomson, 2009), or to 
their combined 70% market share of global recorded music 
revenues in 2018 (Mulligan, 2019), it is easy to see why 
Spotify is considered by some to be “a major thorn in (major) 
labels’ sides” (Sandoval, 2018).
However, just as record labels are dependent on Spotify, 
so is Spotify dependent on record labels. Spotify needs the 
three major labels’ support to facilitate its rapid global expan-
sion. Recently, Sony, Warner, and Universal have begun to 
express hesitation in licensing Spotify for certain new terri-
tories, such as India (Mulligan, 2018c). Although Spotify 
eventually reached a deal with the major labels to launch in 
India, and is (at the time of writing) aiming for South Korea, 
Russia, the Middle East, and Africa, negotiations have been 
long and difficult. As a senior US-based source at one of the 
majors was quoted,
We already have multiple, very strong partners in all of those 
markets . . . It is up to Spotify to convince us why we should help 
them compete. And right now, for obvious reasons, we don’t feel 
very convinced. (Ingham, 2018b)
Moreover, moves to sideline the major labels could end 
up costing Spotify at the negotiating table when new royalty 
rates are renegotiated. Another senior US-based major label 
source told the trade journal Music Business Worldwide,
If Spotify comes in here [during the 2019 re-negotiations] and 
asks for any sort of margin improvement, we’re going to laugh 
them out of the room . . . Over the last six months, trust has 
eroded and they’ve started doing things which seem blatantly 
out to get us. They’re valued at a multiple which is much higher 
than any major label today; perhaps it’s now time for us to start 
clawing that margin back. (Ingham, 2018c)
Thus, while artists and labels are increasingly dependent on 
gaining access to Spotify playlists, in the market for music, 
Spotify remains heavily dependent on content providers—in 
particular the highly consolidated major label groups. While 
the major labels are happy to let Spotify drive their profits, 
they recognize the dangers of allowing Spotify to grow too 
dominant. As another major label source told Music Business 
Worldwide, “Everyone knows it’s really important for us to 
have maybe four or five globally relevant players in [music 
streaming] . . . so anything which drives competition and 
does not advantage Spotify is good thing right now” (Ingham, 
2018c).
One way of driving competition is by aiding the competi-
tion. As Spotify’s closest rival in the West, Apple Music has 
become a favored challenger. Universal Music Group—the 
biggest of the three major record companies—recently part-
nered with Apple to co-create a playlist brand exclusively 
available on Apple Music (Universal Music, 2018). In another 
example, Ministry of Sound—the UK dance music label owned 
by the second largest major, Sony Music Entertainment—
removed all its playlists from Spotify when it signed an exclu-
sive playlist deal with Apple (Aswad, 2018).
These examples demonstrate the contingency of “curato-
rial power.” Platforms like Spotify employ curatorial power 
to mediate markets in the attempt to advance their own inter-
ests, but this power is contingent upon the relative position of 
a platform in relation to its competitors and to the markets it 
is dependent on—such as the market for music. As we will 
see, the field where this struggle is located extends beyond 
the music industry to include other markets: such as the mar-
ket for advertising.
The Advertising Market
While advertising generates merely 10% of the company’s 
total revenues (United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2018), the importance of Spotify’s ad-sup-
ported tier should not be underestimated. Most Spotify users 
are introduced to the service through its free, ad-supported 
tier. As Spotify explained to potential investors in their SEC 
filing: “Our Ad-Supported Service serves as a funnel, driving 
more than 60% of our total gross added Premium Subscribers 
. . .” (United States Securities and Exchange Commission, 
2018, p. 63). Revenue from advertising is also growing more 
quickly than revenue from Spotify’s subscription-based 
Premium tier (Hu, 2018). This trend is predicted to continue 
as the service further expands across Latin America, Africa, 
and Asia to countries “where ad-supported experiences 
remain the dominant norm for digital music consumption” 
(Hu, 2018). Thus, Spotify is highly dependent on its ad-sup-
ported tier to drive both global expansion and revenue.
To advertisers, Spotify promotes itself as the meeting 
place between brands and highly segmented and engaged lis-
teners (see Prey, 2015). Spotify sells its advertising abilities 
to potential clients by touting the unique insights music, and 
data about music behavior, allows access to: “We believe we 
understand people through music, their mood, mind-set, 
activities, and tastes, and we can serve them relevant adver-
tising catered specifically to them” (United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 2018, p. 113).
Like other online publishers, Spotify is struggling to com-
bat the use of ad blockers and other means of ad avoidance.5 
Native advertising has been a popular panacea for dealing 
with this problem (IAB, 2014). On Spotify, playlists provide 
the best opportunity to employ native ads. In recent years, 
Spotify has introduced a number of native advertising fea-
tures that allow brands to reach non-Premium listeners 
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“Sponsored Playlists.” Launched in the spring of 2016, the 
“Sponsored Playlist” program allows brands to sponsor a 
Spotify-curated playlist for 1 week. Along with prominently 
displaying the brand within the playlist, the sponsoring brand 
“surrounds listeners with audio or video messages” during 
every ad break (Spotify for Brands, n.d.-b). As Spotify 
explains to prospective sponsors,
We’ll help you choose which best aligns with your target 
audience, whether they’re tastemakers tuning into New Music 
Friday, gym rats listening to Power Workout, students cramming 
for exams with Brain Food, and more. Our playlists already have 
a passionate, loyal fan base, ensuring that your brand is amplified 
and heard. (Spotify for Brands, n.d.-b)
As Eriksson et al. (2019) point out, playlists “occupy a cen-
tral role in Spotify’s strategy for attracting advertisers” (p. 
137). Playlists allow Spotify to capitalize on a trend whereby 
brands “have turned to popular music in order to make mar-
keting communications more inviting and even desirable” 
(Meier, 2017, p. 12). A particular advantage of playlists is 
that they offer brands the highly coveted opportunity to fol-
low a listener across their day, providing intimate access to 
different moments and moods. This helps to contextualize 
the widely circulated quote by Spotify founder Daniel Ek 
that his platform operated not in the “music space” but rather 
in “the moment space” (Seabrook, 2014).6
To further exploit the commercial potential of playlists, 
Spotify launched “Branded Moments,” a program which 
attempts to take advantage of the real-time insights playlists 
offer into what activities listeners are engaged in. As Spotify’s 
Global VP of Partner Solutions, Danielle Lee put it, “[u]sers 
create really specific playlists for different moments in their 
life, whether it be planning for a dinner party or a birthday 
party, or different types of workouts, [like] yoga or running” 
(quoted in Weissbrot, 2017). With Branded Moments, brands 
can target non-premium listeners based on playlist names 
and music that corresponds with one of seven different 
“moments”: Chill, Dinner, Focus, Party, Sleep, Workout, and 
Dayparts (Spotify for Brands, n.d.-c). More recently, Spotify 
has started allowing brands to sponsor its flagship personal-
ized playlist “Discover Weekly.” Other personalized playl-
ists, such as “Release Radar” and “Daily Mix” are also being 
considered for brand sponsorship (Tiffany, 2019).
Liz Pelly (2017) argues that “playlists exist largely to make 
music more easily commodifiable.”7 From a marketer’s per-
spective, playlists are disembodied contexts, desires, and moods 
that can be assembled and reassembled around potential con-
sumers. While Spotify has leveraged its vast data set of over 200 
petabytes (United States Securities and Exchange Commission, 
2018) to build playlists around almost every conceivable mood 
or moment, brands can now leverage these same playlists to tar-
get these very same moods and moments. Reporting on the 
launch of Spotify’s “Branded Moments” program, Advertising 
Age explains how the drink-maker Bacardi is “sponsoring party 
moments” to introduce its “We Are the Night” campaign. The 
company will be “trying to hit consumers when they’re either 
‘pre-gaming’ or in the Uber on the way to a night out” (Sloane, 
2016). “Based on the playlists that they’re activating, we know 
the moments they are in,” remarked Spotify’s Danielle Lee 
(quoted in Sloane, 2016). These moments, according to Liberty 
Kelly, Spotify Head of Sales for the Americas, “are all opportu-
nities now for a brand to come in and own” (BeetTV, 2016). 
Thus, playlists not only provide Spotify with some control over 
the music market, they also facilitate the curation of listeners for 
brands in the advertising market.
However, just as in the music market, “curatorial power” 
in the market for advertising is both precarious and contin-
gent on many factors that are outside of Spotify’s control. 
One pronounced threat is in attracting brands to Spotify-
curated playlists in the first place. Brands must want to target 
listeners via the “moments” and the playlists Spotify offers 
instead of opting for reaching listeners through cheaper pro-
grammatic ads. As any casual user of Spotify’s ad-supported 
version can attest, marketers have for the most part declined 
the opportunity to utilize Spotify’s wealth of data to target 
listeners. As Vonderau (2019, p. 11) points out, marketers, 
“have not generally adopted Spotify’s high value, ‘premium 
environment for premium brands’ vision at scale so far and 
are not regularly using the service’s targeting features.”8 
Instead, most advertisers choose broad reach over micro-
targeting (Eriksson et al., 2019, p. 156). Frequent complaints 
by Spotify users on the Spotify Community forum about the 
inappropriateness of ads demonstrates this. This presents a 
problem for Spotify, as the platform can charge a higher 
CPM for targeted ads. Spotify is struggling to increase the 
value generated from its ad-supported tier. The service gen-
erated an average of just 1.03 euros per free listener in the 
first quarter of 2018, compared to 13.83 euros per Premium 
subscriber over the same period (Levy, 2018).
What is more, the very existence of an ad-supported free 
tier is contingent upon the major record labels; and Universal, 
Sony, and Warner have long been opposed to Spotify’s free 
tier. The labels are concerned about the monetization of 
Spotify’s free users, as ad-supported streams pay far less in 
royalties than do streams from a paid subscription. “We’re 
always, always looking at Spotify’s free tier,” one major 
label source told the trade journal Music Business Worldwide. 
“If we pulled it completely, we might lose [a nine-figure 
sum] each year. But would that mean that subscription reve-
nue would actually grow at a stronger rate?” (Ingham, 
2018c). Another option is for the major labels to refuse to 
license their music for Spotify’s ad-supported tier in 
Scandinavia and other mature markets where Spotify has the 
highest number of subscribers. These markets, however, are 
also the most lucrative advertising markets and their loss 
would considerably impede Spotify’s efforts to become 
profitable—thus potentially hurting Spotify in the market 
we will look at next: the finance market.
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Finally, an even cheaper and more widespread form of 
“native advertising” exists for brands to exploit on Spotify. 
Just like individual users, brands can build their own third-
party editorial playlists on the service. McDonald’s, for exam-
ple, can share its music taste with Spotify users: it does so 
through a dozen public playlists, with names such as “Lovin’ 
is in the Air” and “Freshly Brewed.” “Just like other Spotify 
users do,” Spotify recommends to its brand clients, “show the 
world what kind of music your brand likes to listen to while 
partying, driving, or enjoying a cup of coffee” (cited in Pelly, 
2017b). We can understand this as Spotify’s “interpretation of 
corporate personhood” (Pelly, 2017b)—the legal recognition 
of corporations as individuals with the same rights, protec-
tions, and abilities that are enjoyed by human beings.
In its guidelines, Spotify does warn brands to avoid turn-
ing these playlists into “a commercial for your product”. 
However, the very naming of these playlists (i.e., “Legends 
of Hip-Hop by BMW”) and the fact that hyperlinks are often 
included in playlist descriptions demonstrates Spotify’s 
inability to police such guidelines. Moreover, although 
Spotify advises brands to “use your own discretion to avoid 
implying any endorsements”, brands are not required to ask 
permission of artists, or to pay compensation to align their 
message with a particular artist on Spotify. Indeed artists 
often have no idea they have been added to a brand’s playlist. 
Nevertheless, while the critique of “selling out” may have 
lost some of its cultural power (Klein et al., 2017), and while 
most artists will not complain “out of fear of tarnishing their 
relationship with Spotify or possible brand partnerships in 
the future” (Meiselman, 2018), some artists will no doubt 
react negatively to finding out that they have been placed on 
a brand-sponsored or brand-created playlist (Pelly, 2017). 
Regardless of how they react, however, there is no way to opt 
out of such a placement. Since brands are treated as individu-
als, they have the same right to create and share playlists as 
any other Spotify user.
This reminds us that curatorial power—the capacity to 
advance one’s interests through the organizing and pro-
gramming of content—can also be used by other agents, 
such as brands.9 In essence, the content that Spotify licenses 
from artists and their labels is being used—for free—by 
major brands like McDonald’s, BMW, and Nike to boost 
their visibility. Thus, Spotify depends on the curation of 
content it does not own to attract listeners to brands it can-
not control.
The Finance Market
It is the market for financial capital that arguably provides us 
with the clearest insight into the importance of Spotify-
curated playlists for the platform, and the contingency of 
curatorial power.
While Spotify posted its first profitable quarter in the 
fourth quarter of 2018, its operating losses have continued to 
grow (Spotify Investors, 2019). This is in large part a result of 
following the “Get Big Fast” business model (Crain, 2014); a 
model that encourages rapid global scaling in a race to first 
capture market share before focusing on profitability.
To pursue this strategy, Spotify has been highly dependent 
on finance capital and investors. Spotify raised US$1.6 bil-
lion from 2008 to 2015, from Coca-Cola, Goldman Sachs, 
and other investors (Vonderau, 2019, p. 9). In the spring of 
2016, Spotify collected another US$1 billion in debt financ-
ing, under terms that were reportedly very favorable to inves-
tors, which included TPG Capital and Dragoneer Investment 
Group (McIntyre, 2016). Before it went public in early 2018, 
Spotify was the highest valued venture-capital-backed com-
pany in Europe (Vonderau, 2019, p. 3) and the only European 
“unicorn” startup in the global top 50. Upon its direct listing 
on the New York Stock Exchange in the spring of 2018, 
Spotify was valued at over US$26 billion.
Finance capital is keeping Spotify afloat under one pre-
tense: that Spotify will one day become profitable. There are 
two basic strategies that the company could follow to achieve 
profitability. The first involves both raising subscription rates 
and increasing advertising revenues. But this strategy does not 
seem promising as Spotify attempts to move beyond its strong-
holds in Europe and North America into lower income mar-
kets in Asia, Africa, and South America. Therefore, the focus 
is on a second strategy: disruption through disintermediation.
Since Spotify does not control the rights to the music that 
it provides on its platform, it must pay copyright holders—
including major and independent record labels—for every 
stream of every track. Reports suggest that the major labels 
(Universal, Warner, and Sony) receive between 52% and 
54% of the net revenue generated by their artists on the plat-
form, while independent record labels are paid between 50% 
and 52% (Ingham, 2018d; Sandoval, 2018). Once music 
publishers are also accounted for, roughly 70% of Spotify’s 
revenue is paid directly to rights holders (Singleton, 2015). 
As it is unlikely that these rates will ever be substantially 
reduced through negotiation, Spotify must therefore reduce 
its reliance on content providers.
A survey of stock analysis and investment publications 
(Gerber, 2018; Wyatt, 2017) reveals a frequent comparison 
of Spotify to Netflix; with the music streaming platform 
often referred to as “the Netflix of Music.” Netflix is touted 
as a model due to its success in producing its own content 
and thus reducing its reliance on Hollywood studios. Both 
implicitly and explicitly, investors are pushing Spotify to “do 
a Netflix.” As Mark Mulligan (2018b) of MIDiA Research 
recently explained,
Speaking from the experience of months of deep conversations 
with large institutional investors, Wall Street has pumped money 
into Spotify stock not because of how it will help labels’ 
businesses, but because they expect it to replace labels, or, at the 
very least, compete with them at scale . . . They are investing in 
the potential upside on a future industry changer, not a present-
day industry defender.
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Spotify-curated playlists are a key mechanism through which 
the platform can indicate its disruptive potential to investors. 
The growing importance of such playlists for music discov-
ery and hit-making has allowed Spotify to experiment with 
attempts to reduce its reliance on record labels. Perhaps the 
most controversial experiment has been Spotify’s use of 
“fake artists.” In the summer of 2016, Music Business 
Worldwide reported that Spotify was paying producers a flat 
fee to create tracks under fake names (Ingham, 2016). This 
content was being produced in order to fill out Spotify-
curated playlists and thus reduce royalty payments to record 
labels. All of these tracks were found on Spotify mood playl-
ists such as “Peaceful Piano,” “Deep Focus,” and “Ambient 
Chill,” where they generated “hundreds of thousands or, in 
many cases, millions of streams” (Ingham, 2018a). As 
recently as 2 August 2018, over 90% of the tracks on the 
Spotify playlist “Ambient Chill” were under the names of 
these so-called “fake artists” (Ingham, 2018a).
Further evidence for this strategy emerged when Billboard 
reported in the summer of 2018 that the streaming platform 
was offering significant advances to a number of indepen-
dent artists if they would license their music directly to 
Spotify (Karp, 2018b). By paying the artist directly, Spotify 
would be able to improve its margins, while the artist would 
receive much more per stream than they would if signed to a 
major label. More important, however, is the signal that this 
move sent to investors: Spotify’s stock price rose 8% after 
the news of the direct deals was reported (Karp, 2018a).
While Spotify has to-date made limited moves in this 
direction—and in July 2019 it discontinued a short-run fea-
ture that allowed artists to directly upload music to the 
service—the writing is clearly on the wall. By entering into 
direct relationships with artists, Spotify could slowly begin 
squeezing out intermediaries such as record labels and dis-
tributors, thus improving its margins and pleasing investors. 
Spotify could then potentially fill its popular playlists with 
these unsigned artists. Indeed, given the aforementioned 
importance of playlists in an artist’s career, the promise—or 
perhaps the perception—that licensing one’s music to 
Spotify might result in advantageous playlist placements is 
an attractive offer for many artists. According to Billboard 
“[s]ome acts say they are tempted to sign direct deals with 
Spotify not just for the advance fee and the higher potential 
payouts per stream, but for the prospect of better placement 
on top playlists” (Karp, 2018a).
While these schemes may help Spotify to reduce its con-
tent costs, improve its razor thin margins, and in turn appear 
more attractive to investors, they are not without consider-
able risk. While Netflix is often cited as a model, the recorded 
music industry is much more consolidated than the television 
industry. A small group controls almost all of the content 
Spotify distributes: The three major music companies com-
bined control about 70% of global recorded music revenues 
(Mulligan, 2019) and according to Spotify’s internal data, 
approximately 87% of all the music streamed by users in 
2017 is licensed either to one of the majors, or to Merlin, the 
agency representing independent labels (United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 2018). If the largest 
major—Universal Music Group—decided to remove its con-
tent from Spotify, the platform would be in serious trouble. 
Disintermediation could thus prove deadly if Spotify pro-
ceeds too quickly with this strategy. Spotify acknowledges 
this danger in the company’s F-1 filing:
We have no control over the providers of our content, and our 
business may be adversely affected if our access to music is 
limited or delayed. The concentration of control of content by 
our major providers means that even one entity, or a small 
number of entities working together, may unilaterally affect our 
access to music and other content. (United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 2018)
Yet, notwithstanding the risks involved, there is a clear 
“incentive to bias” the needs of finance (Rieder & Sire, 2014). 
Spotify is both heavily dependent on record labels for its sur-
vival, and unsustainable as a business if it continues to rely on 
record labels for its content. However, it risks losing investors 
if it does nothing. According to Eriksson et al. (2019, p. 8) by 
2015, finance became “the leading market from which 
Spotify’s other markets and their actors were governed” due 
to “the dependence of the money-losing company on such 
capital.” Therefore, as Mark Mulligan (2018a) explains, “[t]
he challenge for Spotify is whether it can execute on the strat-
egy quickly enough to excite investors (and thus drive up the 
share price), but slowly enough to keep record labels on 
board.” While this is a highly risky and contentious strategy, 
it is a strategy that makes sense when we understand plat-
forms within the ecosystem of markets they interface.
While platforms such as Spotify publicly identify as tech-
nology companies that distribute content (Napoli & Caplan, 
2017), continued financial investment is dependent on strate-
gies that incrementally position themselves as content pro-
ducers. Spotify’s focus on creating and promoting playlists 
can be argued to be one outcome of its dependence on finance 
capital. Finance thus influences in no small way the form 
music takes on streaming platforms. Therefore, even while 
Spotify exerts curatorial power in creating and promoting 
playlists, this agency is embedded within larger structural 
relations. Playlists thus both signal agency and reveal struc-
tures within which platforms are embedded.
Conclusion
Spotify is sometimes described as having “the power of retail 
and radio rolled into one” (Ingham, 2018c). Scholars seem to 
agree: Research has demonstrated that the platform wields 
“power to influence consumption decisions” (Aguiar & 
Waldfogel, 2018, p. 4). As a result, Spotify has become a 
“new gatekeeper” (Bonini & Gandini, 2019) and “a very 
powerful intermediary” (quoted in Shah, 2018).
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Nevertheless, it is important to ask; where does the power 
of “platformization” reside? To answer this question, this 
article analyzed the interlinked set of markets that the leading 
audio streaming platform—Spotify—is embedded in. As 
demonstrated, Spotify’s survival and success are dependent 
on its ability to solve the “chicken and-egg problem”—to suc-
cessfully stitch together various and often conflicting markets 
or “sides.” Music is marketed to listeners who are, in turn, 
marketed to advertisers. In both the market for music and the 
market for advertisers, Spotify must promise greater access to 
a rapidly growing mass of global consumers. But to finan-
cially support its “Get Big Fast” business model, Spotify must 
attract continued investment within the finance market.
This article examined these power dynamics through the 
lens of the playlist. As predicted by du Gay and Negus 
(1994), the generation and analysis of user data shifts control 
to actors whose expertise is in the knowledge of consump-
tion patterns. As music consumption has shifted toward plat-
forms, so has the ability to control the way in which music is 
presented. If record labels in the 1990s complained about 
music retailers using sales data to take control of “their prod-
uct” through pricing and display strategies (du Gay and 
Negus, 1994), the datafication of user behavior on streaming 
platforms enables dynamic curation and personalized recom-
mendations (Prey, 2019). By dis-assembling albums and 
reassembling tracks into playlists, platforms like Spotify 
transform the content they acquire in the market for music. In 
doing so, they attempt to attract brands in the advertising 
market, and investors in the market for finance.
As playlists have emerged as the central means through 
which music is organized and presented on platforms such as 
Spotify, they have instantiated relations of dependency and a 
version of “backward integration.” Playlists thus can be seen 
as a central example of how platforms like Spotify enlist 
what I refer to as “curatorial power”: the capacity to advance 
one’s own interests, and affect the interests of others, through 
the organizing and programming of content. However, 
“power” is a dispositional concept that indicates a potential-
ity (Lukes, 2007), and—as demonstrated in this article—
“curatorial power” is a highly contingent form of power. 
Playlists provide Spotify with a tool through which to gradu-
ally reduce its reliance on record labels by slowly increasing 
the percentage of directly licensed or unsigned content within 
these playlists. This introduces the potential that Spotify 
could offer plum playlist positions to artists who eschew the 
label route and directly license music to the service. While 
investors (and perhaps select unsigned artists) would benefit, 
this would cause tensions with record labels: one of the most 
important “sides” a multisided platform like Spotify must 
attempt to coordinate. Spotify must therefore exert curatorial 
power to simultaneously deepen the dependency of record 
labels on playlist promotion while reducing its own depen-
dency on the content provided by these same labels. At the 
same time, to appease investors by generating more revenue 
from advertising, Spotify must ensure the playlists become 
an even more attractive tool to segment consumers for big 
brands, while placating demands by the major labels to make 
the platform’s ad-supported tier more restrictive.
It is critically important that we properly conceptualize 
the “power” of platforms and so-called “platformization.” 
Just as platforms are not merely neutral conduits through 
which content flows, neither are they empty sites upon which 
conflicting markets do battle. Platforms exert their own 
agency in various ways, such as through “curatorial power.” 
However, playlists can be seen as both a mechanism through 
which a platform may exert curatorial power and an outcome 
of the conflicting pressures and tensions between markets. 
Platform curation is not only shaped by a blend of editorial 
and algorithmic logic (Bonini & Gandini, 2019), but by the 
interplay between the various markets a platform is embed-
ded within. Curatorial power is contingent upon the relative 
position of a platform in relation to its platform-competitors, 
the various markets a platform must engage in, and the ten-
sions between these markets.
Thus, one contribution that this article makes is to remind 
researchers to look beyond the platform to understand the impli-
cations of “platformization.” While platformization results in 
cultural producers becoming increasingly platform dependent 
(Nieborg & Poell, 2018), these platforms are, in turn, dependent 
on actors “elsewhere” (Vonderau, 2019, p. 15). As researchers 
this means that to grasp platformization and its implications for 
content producers and culture, we need to understand the mar-
kets and ecosystems platforms are embedded within, and the 
inter-capitalist struggles that play out through platforms. 
Platform “power,” as this case study of Spotify demonstrates, 
is an always unstable and shifting outcome of the ongoing 
attempt to coordinate between these markets and actors.
Platforms are thus not inherently powerful, nor should we 
conceive of platformization as an instance of power that 
originates within platforms (Eriksson et al., 2019, p. 33). 
Platformization as “power” is best understood as an effect of 
certain conflicted processes, for which platforms have vary-
ing degrees of control over. From this perspective, what we 
call “platformization” is one moment within a much longer 
political-economic process.
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Notes
1. This includes personalized playlists such as “Discover Weekly,” 
“Daily Mix,” “Release Radar,” and “Your Summer Rewind,” 
which are algorithmically generated for individual users. It also 
includes playlists created by in-house Spotify editorial teams, 
curated around specific genres, moods, and contexts, such as 
“RapCaviar,” “Peaceful Piano,” and “Summer BBQ.”
2. As of 10 January 2019, according to https://www.spotontrack.
com/playlists
3. To decide which tracks to add or delete from a playlist, and the 
order the tracks will appear, Spotify uses playlist performance 
tracking tools to monitor exactly how often a song is played, 
saved, and skipped. Such tools also provide demographic data 
on the playlist’s listeners; where they are from, when they lis-
ten, and whether they pay for Spotify Premium (see Bonini & 
Gandini, 2019).
4. However, major labels still dominate on popular playlists such 
as “Today’s Top Hits” and “RapCaviar.”
5. Over 2 million Spotify users are blocking ads (United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 2018, p. 25).
6. Spotify’s internal data reveal that the “top listening moment 
is ‘chill’ with 14% of streams.” This may account for the vast 
number of playlists with the word “chill” in their title (Spotify 
for Brands, n.d.-a).
7. Here, I simply mean that playlists make it easier for Spotify 
to sell advertising spots to brands as they act as a proxy for 
listener desires and contexts. An argument could also be made 
that curation is the commodity that Spotify trades in, and that 
playlists are the form that such a commodity increasingly takes 
on music streaming platforms. However, I do not have the 
space to develop this argument here (see Eriksson et al., 2019; 
Fleischer, 2017; Morris & Powers, 2015).
8. Instead, Spotify appears to rely on IP address-based tracking to 
push geotargeted ad content (see Vonderau, 2019, p. 12).
9. As one reviewer pointed out, artists (and other celebrities) can 
also exert curatorial power. According to the playlist tracking 
service Spotontrack.com, the most followed artist-created playl-
ist on 24 July 2019 was “Armin van Buuren Presents.” However, 
this playlist only ranks as Spotify’s 324th most followed playl-
ist, with almost entirely Spotify-curated playlists ahead of it.
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